We use 20 household surveys for India's 15 major states spanning 1960-1994 to study how the sectoral composition of economic growth and initial conditions interact to influence how much economic growth reduced consumption poverty. The elasticities of measured poverty to farm yields and development spending did not differ significantly across states. But the elasticities of poverty to (urban and rural) non-farm output varied appreciably, and the differences were quantitatively important to the overall rate of poverty reduction. The non-farm growth process was more pro-poor in states with initially higher farm productivity, higher rural living standards relative to urban areas, and higher literacy.
Introduction
While cross-country comparisons indicate that measures of absolute poverty in developing countries tend to fall with growth in mean household income or consumption, there is considerable variance in the poverty reducing impact of a given rate of growth. For example, on studying spells constructed from successive household surveys for a set of developing countries, Ravallion and Chen (1997, Table 6 ) obtain a point estimate of (minus) three for the elasticity of the proportion of the population living below $1/day (at 1985 Purchasing Power Parity) to change in the real survey mean. Their 95% confidence interval, however, goes from about one to five. Add to this the variance in how much GDP growth translates into growth in average household incomes and one can see that a rate of growth that brings rapid poverty reduction in one country might largely leave the poor behind in another.
What explains why growth is more pro-poor in some economies than others? Addressing this question with cross-country data raises a number of measurement problems. There are concerns about the comparability of both the primary survey data used for poverty measurement and the likely explanatory variables such as indicators of inequality. This paper pursues an alternative route in which we compare the evolution of poverty measures over several decades in India, for which it is possible to construct a long time series of 20 comparable -highly comparable by the standards of international comparisons -surveys spanning a 35 year period.
We test for inter-state differences in the poverty impact of various sources of growth in India, and we try to explain the differences. There are clearly country-wide factors that have influenced growth and poverty reduction in India, and comparisons of experiences over time in different states cannot throw much light on those factors. Here we focus on the extent to which differences in initial conditions at state level account for differing state experiences in the poverty-reducing impact of growth.
We build on our past work on poverty in India. Consistent with cross-country evidence for developing countries, measures of absolute consumption-poverty in India tend to fall with economic growth . But one also finds that: (i) the sectoral composition of growth matters to the aggregate (country-wide) rate of poverty reduction: the aggregate time series data for India indicate that poverty measures have responded far more to rural economic growth than urban economic growth , 2 and
(ii) differences in initial conditions related to rural development and human resource development accounted for a sizable share of the long run differences between states in rates of rural poverty reduction (Datt and Ravallion, 1998a) .
However, in Datt and Ravallion (1998a) , initial conditions entered additively with growth;
favorable initial conditions meant a higher rate of poverty reduction at a given rate of growth, but a given growth rate was deemed to have the same impact on the rate of poverty reduction whatever the initial conditions. Clearly, this type of specification cannot tell us how initial conditions might influence the growth elasticity of poverty.
This paper tests an encompassing model of the evolution of the aggregate (urban plus rural) poverty measures at state level. Our model allows for multiplicative interactions of the sectoral composition of growth with initial conditions in determining the evolution of state-level poverty measures. In other words, we examine whether the impact of growth on poverty at given initial conditions also depends on those conditions. In addition to helping us understand what makes growth in a given sector of the economy more pro-poor, we will be able to test for 2 "Rural (urban) economic growth" refers to growth in mean consumption in rural (urban) areas; Ravallion and Datt (1996) also find that "primary" and "tertiary" sector growth had greater impact on poverty than "secondary" sector growth. Thorbecke and Jung (1996) come to a similar conclusion for Indonesia, using a different method based on simulations with a Social Accounting Matrix. There is a large literature, and much debate, on the role of agricultural growth in poverty reduction (Lipton and Ravallion, 1995, section 5.2; Datt and Ravallion, 1998b) . possible trade offs; for example, do certain conditions foster a more pro-poor agricultural growth process, but a less pro-poor non-farm growth process?
The next section discusses the arguments that have been made as to why inequalities in various dimensions matter to reducing poverty. After reviewing the literature, we present a rudimentary theoretical model of how non-farm economic growth reduces poverty in a dualistic economy. The model assumes that any farm worker who wants to participate in the non-farm sector incurs a cost in doing so. This cost determines the equilibrium earnings differential between the poor farm sector and a non-poor non-farm sector. It is evident that such a cost lowers overall output. We argue that it also makes output gains less pro-poor. We show that the higher initial poverty rate, the less the rate of poverty reduction from a given rate of non-farm economic growth. The labor market dualism means that there will be less growth, and less of that growth will benefit the poor.
Motivated by this model, we explore the determinants of poverty reduction in India. We first establish that there are significant differences between states in the extent to which the poor have benefited from (urban and rural) non-farm economic growth (section 3.1). Elasticities with respect to farm yields and state development spending have not, however, differed significantly between states. We then test for interaction effects between non-farm growth and initial conditions related to labor market dualism and human resource development (section 3.2). We find a number of significant interaction effects, broadly consistent with the predictions of our theoretical model. Section 4 concludes.
What makes growth pro-poor?
It has been said often that economic growth is not sufficient for poverty reduction. Other things matter. For example, human resource development for poor people is now widely seen as a necessary component -alongside economic growth -of an effective strategy for fighting poverty (World Bank, 1990 ). In the case of India, our previous work points to the importance of favorable initial conditions in human resource development and rural infrastructure in promoting higher rates of rural poverty reduction at a given rate of agricultural growth (Datt and Ravallion, 1998a ).
The issue we focus on here is whether the things that matter beyond the rate of economic growth enter additively or multiplicatively with growth. In other words, we ask here whether there a complementarity between these conditions and growth such that their combined effect is greater than the sum of their effects individually. Is it a matter of ticking off as many items as possible from a list of poverty-reducing actions, with a given additional impact of each action?
Or are there important interaction effects, such that only certain combinations do the trick? And,
if so, what are the key combinations?
Arguments from the literature
It is evident that the distribution of consumption matters to the level of consumption poverty at a given level of mean consumption. But does initial distribution also matter to the subsequent rate of poverty reduction? One possible way it could matter is through the rate of growth in the mean. A long-standing view -though for long periods a minority view amongst development economists it seems -has held that income inequality can be harmful to the pace of economic growth in poor countries. For example, in the 1920s and 1930s, Gunnar Myrdal believed that "..an equalization in favor of the low-income strata was also a productive investment in the quality of people and their productivity" (Myrdal, 1984, p.154) .
A number of arguments have also been made as to why poverty can impede growth.
3 One such argument points to the existence of credit market failures such that collateral is needed to 3 For surveys of recent arguments on this see Bϑnabou (1996) and Bruno et al (1998). secure loans. Naturally the poor are less able to exploit opportunities for investment in (physical and human) capital; this lowers the growth rate, and more so the greater the proportion of poor (and hence investment constrained) people there are in the economy (see, for example, Binswanger et al., 1995) .
In addition to its potentially adverse implications for the rate of economic growth, high initial inequality is a likely candidate in explaining why the same rate of economic growth might be less effective in reducing poverty in one setting than another. Intuitively, in an economy where inequality is persistently low, the poor will tend to obtain a higher share of the gains from growth than in an economy in which inequality is high. There is supportive evidence from crosscountry distributional data that higher initial income inequality entails a lower (absolute) elasticity of poverty to growth in average incomes (Ravallion, 1997; Timmer, 1997) . For example, a country with a Gini index of 0.25 can expect a growth elasticity of the headcount index of around -3.3, while for a country with a Gini index of 0.60, the elasticity is -1.8 (Ravallion, 1997) .
But what specific determinants of "inequality" are likely to matter? The Gini index for incomes can be thought of as a product of various dimensions of inequality. Some inequalities may matter more than others to how much the poor share in growth.
A potentially important factor in developing countries is the extent of the income disparities between urban and rural sectors. The existence of earnings and other income disparities between urban and rural sectors is clearly an important dimension of overall inequality in developing countries (Fields, 1980; Bourguignon and Morrison, 1998 , who provide supporting evidence from cross-country comparisons.) Arguably, dualism also limits prospects for pro-poor growth. There is a long-standing view (though not a dominant one it would seem) that rural underdevelopment constrains prospects for industrialization; see for example Clarke (1940) . Again factor market distortions also entail that urban-rural inequality impedes poverty reduction through non-farm economic growth. Consider, for example, the classic model of Harris and Todaro (1970) in which wages in the non-farm sector are fixed above market clearing levels.
While there is mobility between the urban and rural sectors, rural workers who move to the city will not all be able to get the new jobs, and so they will face unemployment, or turn to relatively low-paid urban informal sector activities. Then the extent of this distortion will influence both the wage rate in the rural economy and the extent to which the poor are able to gain from an expending non-farm sector.
The initial population distribution between urban and rural sectors can also matter to the growth elasticity of poverty. In general, a change in the population distribution will shift the Lorenz curve in a dual economy. The direction of that effect is, however, theoretically ambiguous. For example, under the Kuznets Hypothesis, inequality will be low at both low and high levels of urbanization (Robinson, 1976; Fields, 1980; Anand and Kanbur, 1993) .
Urbanization is widely viewed as a positive factor in promoting rural non-farm economic growth, by expanding markets. Schultz (1953) noticed that rural non-farm activities tend to be more developed in the periphery of urban-industrial centers, and this has been confirmed in many countries. Enterprises are probably attracted to urban areas because of the larger local product markets, the availability of a skilled workforce, the wider variety of production inputs, the possibility of technological spillovers, and better infrastructure (Lanjouw and Lanjouw, 1997) .
It can be argued that these same factors will also matter to the growth elasticity of poverty.
It is plausible that the poor will tend to be more constrained in their access to markets and infrastructure than the non-poor, and that the poor will tend to gain more from relaxing those constraints than do the non-poor. Assuming that the level of urbanization in an area reflects these differences in access to markets and infrastructure, one can then expect that (other things being equal) the poor will be able to benefit more from non-farm growth when they live in a more urbanized area.
Another factor influencing initial distribution and (hence) the elasticity of poverty to nonfarm economic growth is the productivity of the main competing sector for workers, namely farming. For example, multiple cropping, irrigation and the spread of high-yielding varieties will probably entail a tighter labor market for the non-farm sector, and hence bring benefits to the new recruits into that sector through higher wages.
Inequalities in ownership of physical and human assets are also likely to influence the prospects for poor people to participate in economic growth. Indeed, the credit-market failure argument as to why inequality matters to the rate of growth assumes that it will be the poor who are locked out of growth prospects. Low basic education attainments are often identified as a source of income inequality. 4 Education will also influence how much the poor are equipped to participate in skill-demanding non-farm growth (relative to farming). This too is not a new observation. In the 1950s, Jacob Viner wrote that "The first requirements of high labor productivity under modern conditions are that the masses of the population shall be literate, healthy, and sufficiently well fed to be strong and energetic" (Viner, 1953, p.100) . More recently, the view that there are important synergies between human resource development and growth-oriented policy reforms has been a prominent theme in writings on development;
examples include Drèze and Sen (1995) writing on India, and Thorbecke and Jung (1996) on Indonesia. The World Bank's approach to poverty reduction has also emphasized the importance 4 See, for example, the discussions in Tinbergen (1975) and Atkinson (1997) . Evidence from cross-country comparisons of income-inequality reducing effects of average education attainments can be found in Li et al. (1998). of combining human resource development with economy-wide policies favorable to growth (particularly following World Bank, 1990) .
Growth and poverty reduction in a simple dual economy model
The last section sketched a number of arguments as to why economic growth might be more effective at reducing poverty in some developing economies than others. It would take a complex model to capture all these factors. Here we only offer a starkly simple model focusing on what is arguably the main way that the poor benefit from (urban and rural) non-farm economic growth, namely through its ability to absorb labor from the poor rural farm economy, and from a poor urban informal sector.
The model divides the economy into "farm" and "non-farm" sectors, with higher wages in the latter. Obtaining a job in the non-farm sector requires a lumpy and risky investment (for which neither credit nor insurance are available). One possible interpretation is that the (rural) farm worker must finance migration to the (urban) non-farm economy, and must incur set-up costs at the destination including foregone earnings. Another interpretation is that the rural worker must invest in a minimal amount of schooling to qualify for a non-farm job. To cover the cost of this investment and the risks of moving, workers in the non-farm sector enjoy a wage advantage over those in the farm sector. This wage differential is taken to be exogenously fixed.
In identifying "poverty" in this model, we assume that every worker in the farm sector is poor, but this is not true of any worker in the non-farm sector. So the headcount index of poverty, H, is simply the proportion of the population who fail to obtain work in the non-farm sector. Everyone else is in the non-farm sector, and none are poor. Under these assumptions, there will be a unique equilibrium for the headcount index of poverty equating the relative marginal products of labor with the exogenous wage differential:
This equation shows how the headcount index varies with the productivity enhancing variables Z (interpretable as "growth effects" on poverty) and the wage disparity between sectors, f nf W W / (interpretable as "inequality effects" in this simple model). Given declining marginal products of labor in both sectors, the relative marginal product (the left hand side of 1) is strictly increasing in H given Z. So higher the inter-sectoral wage differential the higher will be the headcount index of poverty.
The "growth effects" depend, however, on whether the output enhancing variables in Z are "labor augmenting" in that they increase the marginal product of labor. If so, then the only way to restore equilibrium after a productivity gain in the non-farm sector is to increase employment in that sector, so returning relative marginal products of labor to their previous level (as determined by the wage differential needed to cover the cost of switching sectors). Then the headcount index satisfying (1) will be strictly decreasing in Z .
We can now return to our question: what determines how pro-poor growth will be? In terms of this model, we want to know what determines the elasticity of H to Z, as given by:
where n η and f η are the wage elasticities of labor demand in the two sectors,
is the weighted mean elasticity of labor demand, and ζ is the vector of elasticities of the marginal product of non-farm labor to Z (i.e.,
The elasticities in (2) are implicitly functions of H. Thus (2) describes how the non-farm growth elasticity of poverty varies with the initial poverty incidence. From (1) we know that H is determined by the productivity parameters of the non-farm sector (Z) and the wage differential. Thus the growth elasticity of poverty is a function of the same variables.
How will the elasticities of poverty w.r.t. productivity gains in the non-farm sector vary with the initial poverty rate in the economy? One cannot predict on a priori grounds how the elasticities in (2) will vary with H. If we focus on the special case of constant elasticities then a particularly sharp result emerges, since (differentiating 2):
Thus the (absolute) elasticity of poverty to labor augmenting productivity gains in the non-farm sector is decreasing in the initial poverty rate. Non-farm growth will reach the poor, but the poorer the setting, the lower the proportionate impact.
The above model points to the importance to the poverty-reducing impact of non-farm growth of a specific aspect of initial distribution, namely initial inter-sectoral income disparities, or "dualism" for short. This will motivate our empirical model (in section 3.2) of the determinants of the non-farm growth elasticity of poverty in India.
Econometric model and results
We begin with a test for inter-state differences in the growth elasticities of poverty. We then try to explain the differences in terms of the variables identified in the last section.
Testing for inter-state differences in the elasticities of poverty
There is a large literature studying the evolution of India's rural poverty measures over time, following (and debating) the seminal contribution of Ahluwalia (1978) ; Datt and Ravallion (1998b) survey this literature. In addition to updating and revising the data, our main point of departure is that we model the aggregate (urban and rural) state-wide poverty measures and we allow for state-specific growth elasticities of poverty. 5 We also allow for state effects in the intercepts and for time varying variables that could well bias our results if they were omitted. We deliberately condition out the interstate differences in the level of poverty, by including state fixed effects. We also allow for state-specific time trends. From this specification we can then exploit the changes over time in aggregate farm and non-farm outputs, and see if their effects on the poverty measures vary across states.
We have estimated various measures of absolute consumption-poverty for each of India's 15 main states using 20 rounds of the National Sample Survey (NSS) spanning the period 1960-61 to 1993-94 at intervals of 0.9 to 5.5 years. We will be concerned with measures of absolute poverty, by which we mean that the poverty line is kept fixed in real terms (or in terms of the standard of living it commands) over the entire (spatial and temporal) domain of poverty measurement (Ravallion, 1994) . We construct three different measures of poverty within the 5 It has been common in the literature to assume that growth responses are the same across all states. The only exception we know of is van de Walle (1985) who relaxes the pooling restrictions in the Ahluwalia (1978) model to allow the elasticities of rural poverty to agricultural output to vary between states. No attempt is made to explain the revealed differences. Foster-Greer-Thorbecke (1984) class of measures: the headcount index (H), the poverty gap index (PG) and the squared poverty gap index (SPG). We have collated the surveys with data on farm yields, non-farm output, government spending, and variables describing initial conditions.
The Appendix provides more detail. Figure 1 plots the trend rates of reduction in the headcount index by state against the trend rates of growth in non-farm product per capita (both estimated by OLS regressions of logarithms on time). There is a positive correlation (r=0.30), though it is not significant (t=1.12). There is clearly enormous heterogeneity in the impact of non-farm economic growth on poverty; the rest of this paper will attempt to explain why.
In testing for inter-state differences in the growth elasticities of poverty, the natural starting point is an econometric specification in which the log of the poverty measure is regressed on the log of mean income, allowing the regression coefficient to vary across states. We want to extend this specification to allow for differences in the elasticities with respect to different sectoral components of aggregate income, and for inflationary shocks. Since we are interested in describing (and later modeling) the growth elasticities rather than levels of poverty we also control for differences between states in the initial level of poverty. (So when we later try to explain the inter-state differences in elasticities, we will not be confusing this question with that of the effects of initial conditions on the initial level of poverty.) To allow for any state-specific omitted time trended variables we also include a state-specific trend.
Combining these features, our test equation takes the form:
where P it is the measure of absolute consumption poverty in state i at date t, NFP is real nonfarm product per person, YLD is farm yield, GOV is real state development expenditure per capita, and INF is the inflation rate. (All these variables are defined more precisely in the Appendix.) Consistently with Datt and Ravallion (1998a) , we found that the fit of this model was improved if we used the two year moving averages of lnYLD and lnNFP, and the lagged value of lnGOV. We initially estimated the model allowing it ε to be an AR1 error term, allowing for the uneven spacing of the surveys (following the method in Datt and Ravallion, 1998a) .
However, the autoregression coefficient was not significantly different from zero so we set it to zero to simplify the estimation method.
To be as flexible as possible, we initially write the i β 's as linear functions of a vector of state dummy variables. Since we also have state-specific time trends and differing effects of inflation, estimating (5) is equivalent to running a separate regression for each state.
However, we found that a degree of pooling was consistent with the data. In particular, we could not reject the null hypothesis of constant coefficients at the 10% level for all variables except non-farm output per person and the state effects in the intercept. 6 We could reject the null that the coefficients on NFP are the same across states at the 7% level or better for all poverty measures.
Thus we impose a constant-coefficients restriction for YLD, GOV, INF and the time trend, leaving the coefficient on NFP free to vary between states and retaining the state fixed effects in the intercepts. An immediate implication of our finding that only the non-farm elasticities vary significantly across states is that we can reject the idea of significant trade-offs; it is not the case that states with higher elasticities with respect to non-farm growth tended to have lower elasticities to agricultural growth or development spending.
6
The failure to reject the null of constant coefficients for all except NFP was statistically convincing; probabilities for the tests of constant coefficients were no lower than 0.12, and most were above 0.25. Details are available from the authors. Table 1 gives the estimated parameters of the restricted version of equation (5) To measure the quantitative importance to the overall rate of poverty reduction of the differences in elasticities we simulated rates of poverty reduction, in which we artificially set the non-farm growth elasticities of all states to a reference value (denoted * NFP β ) set alternately at the lowest and highest elasticities across all states: The significance of inflation confirms our earlier results (Datt and Ravallion, 1997, 1998a,b) . In Datt and Ravallion (1998b) we argued that the main channel through which inflation mattered to India's poor was through its have also led to higher (lower) growth rates then these simulations will have under (over) estimated the gains to rates of poverty reduction. Table 2 compares the national average trend rate of poverty reduction (obtained as OLS regression coefficients of log poverty measures on time) with the simulated rates of poverty reduction using equation (6). Recall from Table 1 that the lowest (absolute) elasticities are for Bihar (for the headcount index) and Jammu and Kashmir (for the other two poverty measures).
If all states had Bihar's low elasticity then the mean rate of poverty reduction would have been only 0.3% per year for the headcount index (versus the observed mean of 1.3%). Under the Jammu and Kashmir elasticities, the average rate of decline in the headcount index would have been 0.8% and 1.0% for the poverty gap and squared poverty gap respectively (versus actual means of 2.2% and 2.8%).
At the other extreme, if all states had Kerala's elasticity then the headcount index would have fallen at a trend rate of 3.5% instead of 1.3% per year. The trend rate of reduction in the squared poverty gap would have been 6.8% per year instead of 2.8%.
Next we try to explain these inter-state differences in the growth elasticities of poverty.
Initial conditions and the non-farm output elasticities of poverty
We now postulate that the elasticities of poverty to non-farm output are a function of initial conditions. Our model in section 2.2 pointed to the importance of labor market dualism between the urban (primarily non-farm) and rural (farm) sectors. So we look for indicators of urban-rural differences in incomes. We assume that YLD, the initial population share in urban areas (URB), the initial ratio of urban to rural average consumption (CDIF), the share of the rural population that was landless at the beginning of the short-term adverse effect on the real wage rate for unskilled labor.
period (LLESS) and the initial irrigation rate in the state (IRR). (More precise definitions can be
found in the Appendix.) Following the discussion in section 2, we also include the literacy rate;
we use the female literacy rate (FLIT) following our previous work (Datt and Ravallion, 1998a) , though it makes little difference if one uses the male rate or the average. This can be interpreted as another determinant of the initial inter-sectoral earnings differential; a poorly educated rural population will presumably face higher costs of entry into the non-farm sector. We also allow for differences in the initial levels of government development spending, which might also influence initial distribution, including the extent of dualism. For example, low levels of development spending might be expected to favor the urban areas, with expansion into rural areas only occurring at higher levels of spending. Table 3 gives the data we will use on these initial conditions. Table 4 gives the results when we replace the state dummy variables in the sub-function for NFP i β by the variables described above. All of these variables are entered in log form.
We find that the non-farm elasticity of poverty is higher in states with higher initial farm yields, higher urbanization rates, lower urban-rural disparities in consumption levels, and states with higher female literacy rates. Controlling for these variables, irrigation, landlessness, and initial non-farm output and development spending are not significant. There is of course considerable overlap in the explanatory power of this set of initial conditions; for example, irrigation density is highly correlated with initial yield and the former becomes significant if the latter is dropped. Table 4 also gives a restricted form of the model dropping the jointly insignificant interaction effects with irrigation, landlessness, initial non-farm output per person, and initial development spending; the restrictions pass comfortably.
On comparing the R 2 values of Tables 1 and 4 , it can also be seen that the variables we have used in explaining the inter-state differences in the non-farm growth elasticities of poverty account for a large share of the variance. For example, with full state dummy variables, the value of R 2 in the regression for the headcount index is 0.916; using our explanatory variables it drops to 0.887 indicating that only 3% of the variance in the poverty measures is accounted for by omitted variables (including measurement errors) influencing the measured non-farm growth elasticity.
We know already that the differences in elasticities with respect to non-farm output were quantitatively important to the rates of poverty reduction. From the results in Tables 3 and 4, we can also say something about the relative importance of the various initial conditions we have identified in explaining the differences in elasticities. Consider the state with the lowest elasticity with respect to the headcount index, namely Bihar with an absolute elasticity of 0.25 ( The number of literate women per 1,000 adult women is logged, so 0.78=0.25+0.30x(5.96-4.23) (recalling that the regressor is the sum of current and lagged output). elasticities of these two states. About two-thirds of the explained difference in elasticities is attributed to the initial differences in literacy alone.
Conclusions
Using state-level data for India spanning 35 years, and allowing for both state-specific fixed effects and time trends, we find that higher average farm yields, higher state development spending, higher (urban and rural) non-farm output and lower inflation were all poverty reducing. However, except for non-farm output, we could not reject the null that all these variables had the same elasticity across states for a given poverty measure. Farm yield growth, for example, was poverty reducing but with a similar elasticity in states with dissimilar initial conditions; thus it was the differences in the rate of agricultural growth that mattered to the poor.
However, the elasticity of poverty to non-farm output varied significantly across states; growth in this sector brought much larger proportionate reductions in consumption-poverty measures in some states than others. Thus, we have been able to derive a state-specific measure of how pro-poor economic growth has been in India over this period.
To assess the importance of differing elasticities, we have simulated the rates of poverty reduction if all states had the non-farm growth elasticity of Kerala, which had the highest elasticity of any state. Then the annual trend rate of reduction in the headcount index over this 35-year period would have been more than two percentage points higher. For a state with the national average poverty rate in 1960 of 45%, this difference in trend rates of poverty reduction would have meant a difference in poverty rate by the mid-1990s of almost 15 percentage points; the poverty rate would have fallen to 13% instead of 28%. Differing growth elasticities appear to have had a powerful longer term impact on the prospects of escaping absolute poverty in India through economic growth.
In attempting to understand the inter-state differences in the non-farm output elasticity of poverty, we have argued that certain inequalities can severely impede the prospects for poverty reduction through non-farm growth. The point can be illustrated by a simple model of dual labor markets, in which transition from the low wage farm sector to the high wage non-farm sector is necessary (and sufficient) for escaping poverty. But a successful transition comes at a cost. Then the initial inter-sectoral disparity in earnings, as needed to cover that cost, influences how much non-farm economic growth will reduce the incidence of poverty. Indeed, in its simplest version with constant labor demand elasticities, the initial poverty rate in the economy constrains the prospects for future poverty reduction through growth; the higher the poverty rate the less effective non-farm economic growth will be in reducing poverty.
We have argued that the inter-state differences in the impact of a given rate of non-farm economic growth on consumption poverty reflect systematic differences in initial conditions. Broadly speaking, our results can be interpreted as indicating that non-farm economic growth was less effective in reducing poverty in states with "poor" initial conditions in terms of rural development (in both absolute terms and relative to urban areas) and human resources. Low farm productivity, low rural living standards relative to urban areas and poor basic education all inhibited the prospects of the poor participating in growth of the non-farm sector.
Rural and human resource development appear to be strongly synergistic with an expanding non-farm economy in reducing poverty. Amongst the initial conditions we have found to matter significantly to prospects for pro-poor growth, the role played by initial literacy is particularly notable. For example, more than half of the difference between the elasticity of the headcount index of poverty to non-farm output for Bihar (the state with lowest elasticity) and Kerala (the highest) is attributable to the latter's substantially higher initial literacy rate. This Appendix describes the main features of our data. A complete description of the data set assembled for this study (including sources of all variables) can be found in Özler, Datt and Ravallion (1996) and the data and manual can be found at the following web site:
http://www.worldbank.org/poverty/data/indiap aper.htm.
We have used a consistent series of absolute poverty measures based on distributions of consumption per capita from 20 rounds of the National Sample Survey (NSS) spanning the The poverty lines we use are those defined by the Planning Commission (GOI, 1979) .
These lines were defined at the per capita monthly expenditure levels of Rs. 49 for rural areas and Rs. 57 for urban areas (rounded to the nearest rupee) at October 1973-June 1974 all-India prices.
The Planning Commission followed the "food-energy method" in deriving the rural and urban lines; these poverty lines thus corresponded to levels of per capita total expenditure at which the caloric norms were typically attained in the rural and urban sectors. They correspond to a norm of per capita food energy intake of 2400 calories per day in rural areas and 2100
calories per day in urban areas. Poverty lines constructed this way have sometimes been found to not have the same purchasing power in urban and rural areas (Ravallion, 1994) . However, independent estimates of the urban-rural cost of living differential for 1973-74 (see Bhattacharya et al, 1980) confirmed the inter-sectoral cost of living differential of about 16% implicit in the Planning Commission poverty lines (see Datt, 1997 , for further discussion).
The nominal consumption distributions for each survey period were converted to constant prices using spatial (cross-state) price indices anchored to the consumption pattern of households in the neighborhood of the poverty line, and temporal consumer price indices for urban and rural sectors anchored to the consumption patterns of low-income workers.
A substantial effort was invested into the construction of a consistent set of price indices across states and survey periods, using monthly data on consumer price indices from the Labour Bureau (disaggregated to the center level for the urban index). Our primary deflators were the Consumer Price Index for Industrial Workers (CPIIW) for the urban sector and the adjusted allIndia Consumer Price Index for Agricultural Labourers (CPIAL) for the rural sector. The adjustment carried out to the CPIAL was for the price of firewood that has been held constant in the official CPIAL series since 1960-61. The nominal state-level distributions were further normalized for inter-state cost of living differentials estimated separately for urban and rural areas. For further details on the construction of the price indices, see Özler, Datt and Ravallion (1996) , Datt (1997) , and Datt and Ravallion (1998a) . The poverty measures are estimated from published grouped distributions of per capita expenditure using parameterized Lorenz curves; for details on the methodology see Datt and Ravallion (1992) .
As discussed above, the poverty measures are hypothesized to depend on both a set of time-dependent variables as well as a set of initial condition variables that determine how poverty-reducing the time-dependent variables are. Building on the empirical approach used in our earlier work (Datt and Ravallion 1998a) , we use time-dependent variables related to agricultural and non-agricultural growth, public spending on economic and social services and inflation. The specific variables used are as follows: The data on SDP and state development expenditure are originally available on an annual basis, while the NSS surveys are not only not annual but they also do not always cover a full 12-month period. To match the annual data with the poverty data by NSS rounds, we have loglinearly interpolated the annual data to the mid-point of the survey period of each NSS round.
We also identify a number of social and economic variables to describe initial conditions around 1960 (that we will later use in attempting to explain the growth elasticities of the poverty measures by state). This is state specific. However, the bulk of the effect is clearly through inter-temporal variation in the rate of inflation. We also tried adding the log of the ratio of the CPIIW to the (adjusted) CPIAL as an additional regressor, but that turned out to be insignificant.
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The initial condition variables are assembled from a number of diverse data sources including the 1961 Census, the Statistical Abstract (Central Statistical Organization) for various years, and reports from a number of NSS surveys dealing with village statistics, land holdings and utilization, fertility, and infant mortality.
Note that we do not include the economic and human resource development indicators in time-varying form as additional explanatory variables in our model for two reasons. First, there are gaps in the available time series data on these variables over the period covered by our analysis. And second, even if a complete time series were available, these indicators in timevarying form would be arguably endogenous to the model. Note: Absolute t-ratios in parentheses; 272 observations. All variables are measured in natural logarithms. A positive (negative) sign indicates that the variable contributes to a higher (lower) rate of increase in the poverty measure. The regressions also included state-specific intercepts.
